In this case before a Connecticut Workers Compensation Review Board (CRB) panel (Linda Matteau V. Mohegan Sun Casino), the claimant is unable to collect workers compensation benefits for a motor vehicle accident in which she was involved while enroute to her employers place of business, Mohegan Sun Casino, because her situation does not demonstrate an exception to the states coming and going rule.

Workers Compensation Commission Chairman, John A. Mastropietro, who wrote the opinion, noted that this case was appealed from an earlier decision in which the trial commissioner concluded that the claimants motor vehicle accident arose out of and in the course of her employment, and was therefore eligible for benefits.

The ultimate issue for review is whether the commissioner erred in concluding that the claimants motor vehicle accident arose out of and in the course of her employment, Mastropietro said.

The pertinent facts are as follows. The claimant was employed by the respondent as a coin service specialist. On November 5, 2002, the claimant was scheduled to meet with an out-of-state vendor at the employers place of business, a casino. While enroute to the casino, claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained injuries.

Previous Decision

In support of [the previous] conclusion, the commissioner found that, inter alia, claimant had a home office equipped with various office equipment in which she routinely performed work for the benefit of the employer, and had begun her work day at home prior to her departure to the casino.

Specifically, the trial commissioner found on the morning of the day of the accident the claimant arose early, reviewed the accuracy of drawings in preparation for an impending meeting with the out-of-state vendor. The claimant departed her home and without deviation proceeded to travel to the casino.

Ordinarily, injuries occurring upon a public highway while traveling to and from work are referred to as coming and going injuries and are generally not considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment.

Mastropietro noted the following exceptions to that rule:

If the work requires the employee to travel on the highways;

Where the employer contracts to furnish or does furnish transportation to and from work;

Where, by the terms of his employment, the employee is subject to emergency calls;

Where the employee is injured while using the highway in doing something incidental to his regular employment, for the joint benefit of himself and his employer, with the knowledge and approval of the employer.

Mastropietro noted that the trial commissioner found, [o]n November 4, 2002 the claimant had taken drawings home and arose early on the morning of November 5, 2002 and reviewed the drawings for approximately forty-five minutes to ensure all changes had been made in preparation for her meeting with the vendor later that morning.

Language is Clear

However, quoting the relevant section of the law, Mastropietro explained, A personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment if the injury is sustained:

At the employees place of abode;

While the employee is engaged in a preliminary act or acts in preparation for work unless such act or acts are undertaken at the express direction or request of the employer.

Mastropietro stated, The language of the statute is clear. An employer is not liable for acts in preparation of work unless directly requested by the employer.

He added, There is no finding that this was done at the direction of the employer. Thus, we conclude that the triers determination that claimants motor vehicle accident arose out of and in the course of her employment is derived from a misapplication of the law. We therefore reverse and dismiss the claim.

Explanation

In further explaining the decision, Mastropietro said that the trial commissioner had made certain findings relating to the existence of a home office and identifying the home as an extension of the employers premises. Those findings suggested that the claimant was unable to complete her job responsibilities during regular work hours, was prohibited from collecting overtime, had a home office equipped with a computer, printer, fax machine, and copy machine, and routinely took work home to the knowledge of her supervisors.

But Mastropietro cited an earlier case, Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Servs. (Labadie I). He explained, The Labadie I panel relied on Larsons Treatise on Workers Compensation Law and its commentary as to the circumstances under which a home office may be determined to be an extension of the employers premises. The panel referenced the three-prong test outlined in the treatise. The three-prong test suggests an analysis in which a claimant must demonstrate a regular and substantial quantity of work to be performed at home, the continuing presence of work equipment in the home, and special employment circumstances that make it necessary rather than personally convenient to work at home.

Mastropietro said, We believe the requirement that special employment circumstances [exist] that make it necessary rather than personally convenient to work at home was not satisfied.

Supporting this conclusion, Mastropietro cited another case, Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd., in which it was determined, [A] home does not become a second jobsite simply because ones employment requires long working hours and the employer knows that the employee frequently brings work home.

Mastropietro said, In the instant matter the triers conclusion substantially relies on the fact that the claimants home was equipped with office machinery, i.e, a computer, printer, fax, and copier. In the not-too-distant past, such home furnishings would be somewhat unique and indicate some portion of a claimants home was dedicated to the performance of office work. Given the present day abundance of home computers and affordability of machines that can fax, print, scan, and copy, the presence of such equipment in ones home does not carry the same probative value it may have enjoyed in prior years when determining the existence of a home office and whether the home office conveyed a benefit to the employer.

Although we are extremely reticent to displace a commissioners factual basis for a conclusion, we believe the triers finding fails to accept matters that are within our common knowledge, i.e., the existence of such equipment in ones home can no longer carry the legal weight and significance accorded in by gone days.

Additionally, there is no question that at the time of the accident the claimant was not being paid by the employer. While the lack of payment per se does not compel a conclusion that the claimant was not within the period of employment at the time of the injury, it is a factor which may be considered. We believe the trial commissioners decision would permit the Workers Compensation Acts expansion to something far closer to a general social insurance policy without the Legislatures promulgation of statutory authority supporting such an outcome.

We therefore reverse and dismiss the instant claim.